Domain Information
Start by mapping the organization's public footprint from a black-box perspective.
Online Presence
Useful first-pass sources:
- TLS certificates (main domain and SANs)
- Certificate Transparency logs (
crt.sh) - DNS records (
A,MX,NS,TXT,SOA)
Example CT query:
https://www.crt.sh/?q=inlanefreight.com
Typical certificate clues to capture:
- certificate validity period
- SAN entries (
www,support,api, etc.) - issuer/provider patterns across subdomains
JSON output:
curl -s https://crt.sh/\?q\=inlanefreight.com\&output\=json | jq .
Example fields worth extracting:
{
"issuer_name": "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3",
"common_name": "matomo.inlanefreight.com",
"name_value": "matomo.inlanefreight.com",
"entry_timestamp": "2021-08-21T06:00:17.173",
"not_after": "2021-11-19T05:00:15"
}
Unique subdomain extraction:
curl -s https://crt.sh/\?q\=inlanefreight.com\&output\=json | jq . | grep name | cut -d":" -f2 | grep -v "CN=" | cut -d'"' -f2 | awk '{gsub(/\\n/,"\n");}1;' | sort -u
Example resulting domains:
account.ttn.inlanefreight.com
blog.inlanefreight.com
matomo.inlanefreight.com
smartfactory.inlanefreight.com
ttn.inlanefreight.com
www.inlanefreight.com
Company-Hosted vs Third-Party Hosts
Distinguish infrastructure you are allowed to test from third-party assets.
for i in $(cat subdomainlist);do host $i | grep "has address" | grep inlanefreight.com | cut -d" " -f1,4;done
Example output:
blog.inlanefreight.com 10.129.24.93
inlanefreight.com 10.129.27.33
matomo.inlanefreight.com 10.129.127.22
www.inlanefreight.com 10.129.127.33
s3-website-us-west-2.amazonaws.com 10.129.95.250
Use the resulting IPs for passive enrichment (for example, Shodan) before active validation.
for i in $(cat subdomainlist);do host $i | grep "has address" | grep inlanefreight.com | cut -d" " -f4 >> ip-addresses.txt;done
for i in $(cat ip-addresses.txt);do shodan host $i;done
Example enrichment snapshot:
10.129.27.33
Organization: InlaneFreight
Open ports: 22/tcp, 80/tcp, 443/tcp
10.129.27.22
Open ports: 25,53,80,81,110,111,443,444
DNS Records
dig any inlanefreight.com
Example record slice:
inlanefreight.com. 300 IN A 10.129.27.33
inlanefreight.com. 3600 IN MX 1 aspmx.l.google.com.
inlanefreight.com. 21600 IN NS ns.inwx.net.
inlanefreight.com. 3600 IN TXT "atlassian-domain-verification=..."
inlanefreight.com. 300 IN TXT "v=spf1 include:mailgun.org ..."
What to extract quickly:
A: domain-to-IP mappingsMX: email provider pathNS: hosting/provider hintsTXT: verifications + email security controls (SPF,DMARC,DKIM)SOA: zone authority metadata
High-value clue mapping:
| Clue Type | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Atlassian / Google / Outlook / Mailgun / LogMeIn | Reveals core business stack and third-party trust boundaries |
| SPF IPs in TXT records | Can expose additional infrastructure IPs |
| NS provider names | Helps infer DNS/hosting architecture |
Quick provider/IP extraction from TXT values can reveal hidden service dependencies worth tracking in your recon notes.
Cloud Resources
Cloud platforms (AWS, Azure, GCP) are standard, but tenant-side misconfiguration can expose data.
Common exposure targets:
- AWS S3 buckets
- Azure Blob storage
- GCP Cloud Storage
Discovery Paths
- DNS/host outputs that reveal cloud endpoints
- Search indexing of public cloud files
- Website source code referencing cloud assets
- Third-party domain/cloud enrichment platforms
Useful search patterns (examples):
intext:<company> inurl:amazonaws.com
intext:<company> inurl:blob.core.windows.net
Example cloud clue in host output:
... s3-website-us-west-2.amazonaws.com ...
Also inspect front-end source for externally loaded assets (JS/CSS/media) that point to cloud object stores.
Practical Workflow
- Collect candidate storage endpoints passively.
- Pivot with company names and known abbreviations.
- Filter by file type and recency.
- Build a prioritized validation list inside scope.
Common recon pivot targets:
- bucket/container naming conventions
- environment labels (
dev,prod,backup,archive) - file extensions (
.pdf,.docx,.zip,.json,.pem,.key)
Risk Signal
Operational pressure often causes accidental public exposure of sensitive files.
Real-world examples include exposed key material, internal documents, or config exports in cloud storage indexes.
Staff
Employee OSINT helps infer technology stack, delivery model, and security maturity.
Primary sources:
- LinkedIn/Xing profiles
- public job postings
- public repositories and shared technical content
Job Post Intelligence
Job requirements can quickly reveal probable stack components:
- languages: Java, C#, C++, Python, Ruby, PHP, Perl
- databases: PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQL Server, Oracle
- frameworks: Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET MVC
- tooling: Git/SVN/Perforce, Atlassian suite, CI/CD
Example extraction workflow from a single job post:
- collect languages and framework requirements
- map likely backend and data layers
- identify CI/CD and collaboration tooling
- infer probable attack surface families (web, API, auth, data)
Profile and Repository Signals
Common recon value:
- framework preferences (front-end/back-end)
- architecture patterns and domain focus
- public code quality and accidental metadata leakage
Signals to bookmark:
- explicit mentions of React/Svelte/Angular/Flask/Django/etc.
- links to personal or org repositories
- project descriptions tied to internal systems (CRM, broker portals, analytics)
Potential exposure indicators:
- personal/work email leakage
- hardcoded secrets/tokens in shared code
- sensitive internal context in project artifacts
Typical leaks seen during staff OSINT:
- personal email addresses reused in commits
- copied secrets/tokens in sample code
- verbose stack traces or configuration fragments in public snippets
Search Strategy
When your goal is infrastructure mapping, prioritize profiles from:
- engineering/development
- platform/infrastructure
- security/operations
Use filters (location, title, company, industry) to reduce noise and improve signal quality.
Recommended output from this phase:
- prioritized employee-role list
- inferred technology stack map
- tooling/provider dependency map
- potential social-engineering and credential-risk observations for reporting